The general rule is that the admission of an agent while he is acting within the scope of his authority and in regard to a matter then depending, or, as it is expressed, dum fervet opus, is binding upon his principal.1 An admission that is merely a state-

14 Ringling v. Kohn, 4 Mo. App. 59.

15 First Nat Bank v. Hanover Nat Bank, 66 Feci R. 34, 13 C. C. A. 313. Compare Western Nat Bank v. Armstrong, 152 U. S. 346.

16 Stewart v. Armstrong, 56 Fed. R. 167.

17 Atlantic Bank v. Merchants'

Bank, 10 Gray, 532. Accord, Skinner v. Merchants' Bank, 4 Allen, 290. Contra, Bank of Charleston v. State Bank, 13 Rich. Law, 291, an indefensible ruling.

1 Another statement of the rule which amounts to the same thing is that the admission must be a ment or narration of a past occurrence is not admissible, because the agent is not authorized to make admissions of that character.2 But if the agent has authority to act about a particular matter, his statements made while acting as agent in regard to the matter are binding upon the bank, whether the statements are an admission as to a past or a present occurrence.3 It must be shown that the declaration was in regard to a matter within the legal sphere of action of the corporate agent.4 It is upon this ground, perhaps, that it has been held that the admission of the genuineness of an indorsement by the bank teller is not binding upon the bank;5 and the admission by a single director not authorized to act for the bank has been held not to be binding upon the bank.6 In one case of doubtful authority it has been held that a bank cashier who rented premises for the bank did not bind the bank by admissions as to the purpose of the bank in renting the premises, or as to the terms of a previous renting.7 It would seem, too, that the statement sought to be considered an admission must have been made to the party relying upon it, or to some one for him;8 but this statement is not entirely free from doubt.9 Stockholders are not authorized merely in their capacity as stockpart of the res gestae. Railroad Co. v. O'Brien, 119 U. S. 99; Idaho Forwarding Co. v. Insurance Co., 8 Utah, 41. Courts sometimes stretch the rule as to what is a part of the res gestae to an unwarranted length. See Huffcutt on Agency, sees. 136-139.

2 Franklin Bank v. Steward, 37 Ma 519.

3 Morse v. Railroad Co., 6 Gray, 450; Malecek v. Tower Grove R R Co., 57 Ma 17.

4 Wyman v. Hallowell Bank, 14 Mass. 58; Salem Bank v. Gloucester Bank, 17 Mass. 21.

5 Walker v. St. Louis Nat Bank, 5 Mo. App. 214. But the principle of the decision could not be applied to a signature of a drawer of a check.

6 East River Bank v. Hoyt, 41 Barb. 441.

7 Union Banking Co. v. Gillings, 45 Md. 181. Compare Merchants' Bank v. Marine Bank, 3 Gill, 96.

8 4 Thompson on Corp., sec. 4918; Carrol v. Railroad Co., 82 Ga. 452.

9 Keysor v. Railroad Co., 66 Mich. 390; but this case is so confused that the reporter of the court despaired of a syllabus. See also Lin-derberg v. Crescent Mining Co., 9 Utah, 163, which case was a most laughable judicial aberration, and is now overruled. People v. Kessler, 13 Utah, 69.

holders to bind the corporation in any way; but when the stockholders are assembled as the ultimate governing body of the corporation in a stockholders' meeting, an admission made by such a body is under some circumstances an admission binding upon the corporation.10