The accommodation maker of a promissory note, though known to be such to the holder, is nevertheless responsible as maker to the holder.1 He certainly cannot claim any demand upon the party whom he accommodated.2 The accommodation indorser, if he be a regular indorser of a note, is of course entitled to have a demand made upon the maker.3 But an indorser for whose accommodation a note was made is the real maker, and if he received the benefit of the note he is not entitled to have a demand made upon the maker.4 An indorser for whose accommodation a bill is made really stands in a different position from an indorser for whose accommodation a note is drawn. It is true the one is really the drawer of the bill, and the other is really the maker of the note. But the drawer of the bill ordinarity has the right to have a demand of payment made, while the maker of a note has not. Therefore the rule is strictly logical that the indorser for whose accommodation a note is made, and who receives the benefit, is not entitled to claim that demand of payment should be made upon the ostensible maker. An accommodation indorser of a note after maturity is simply the accommodation indorser of a note payable upon demand, and should be governed by the same rule. The case of irregular indorsers of promissory notes varies with the rule of law held as to his liability, as will appear in the next section.5

5 The last indorser indorsed an overdue note, and if the demand was good as to him he is held. He can hold any preceding indorser not discharged, and since, as we shall see, any party to the paper, who is subsequent to the person to whom the notice is given, may give notice,the question becomes merely one of notice.

6 A note indorsed overdue becomes a note or bill payable upon demand, and, as will later appear, must be presented within a reasonable time for payment. But there is some authority contra. See French v. Jarvis, 29 Conn. 347; Hall v. Monohan, 6 Iowa, 216.

1 Bank of Montgomery v. Walker, 9 S. & R 229 (here the holder was ignorant of the fact); Marion Nat. Bank v. Phillips, 35 S. W. R 910; Hansborough v. Gray, 3 Grat. 356 (here the holder knew the fact). Contra, Connerly v. Plantei-s' Ins. Co., 66 Ala. 432. See Hays v. Northwestern Nat. Bank, 9 Grat. 127. The same rule would apply as to makers who were accommodation makers for another maker.

2 See last note.

3 French v. Bank of Columbia, 4 Cranch, 141; Braley v. Buchanan, 21 Kan. 274; Rea v. Dorrance, 18 Me. 137; Bogg v. Keil, 1 Mo. 743; Perry v. Friend, 57 Ark. 437; Buck v. Cotton, 2 Conn. 126; Perry v. Green, 19 N. J. Law, 61; Sawyer v. Brownell, 13 R I. 141. The rule as to an irregular indorser is a different matter.

4 It makes no difference whether this indorsement is before or after delivery, or is regular or anomalous. Bank of Washington v. Way, 2 Cranch, C. C. 149; Thornton v. Stoddert, 1 Cranch, C. C. 534; Mar-tel v. Tureaud, 6 Mart. (N. S.) 118; Blenderman v. Price, 50 N. J. Law, 296; Holman v. Whiting, 19 Ala. 703; Torrey v. Foss, 40 Me. 74; First Nat. Bank v. Ryerson, 23 Iowa, 508.