A promissory note differs from a bill of exchange in the fact that it is always payable either at a fixed day or upon demand, and notes payable at a fixed day are like bills so made payable. Promissory notes may be payable upon demand or at a certain date. A demand note as regards the indorser must be presented to the maker for payment within a reasonable time.1 Statutes fix this time at periods varying from six months to shorter periods.2 The statute, of course, is controlling. Until that time has elapsed no demand is necessary.3 But if there be no statute controlling, what is a reasonable time must depend upon circumstances and the situation of the parties;4 the demand upon notes due at a certain day is governed by the rule that, unless days of grace are abolished by a statute controlling the note, or the paper is payable without grace, the note is entitled to days of grace.5 The demand must be made on the day of maturity, which is the last of the three days of grace,6 if grace is allowed; a demand before that day is premature;7 and a demand after that day is, generally speaking, too late,8 unless a custom or usage varies the rule.9 Applying the rule of reasonableness to demand notes, it has been held that a demand note, if negotiated, must be pres3nted for payment upon the next day if the parties reside in the same place,10 and otherwise within due course of mail.11 But no such hard-and-fast rule can be laid down. It is variously stated that a delay of four days12 is reasonable, but of two weeks,18 of four months,14 of seven months,15 of eight months,16 of thirteen months,17 of sixteen months,18 of four years19 and of five years w is unreasonable, but a delay of six days,21 of seven days,22 of sixty days23 is reasonable. There has been some suggestion that if a demand note draws interest the indorser remains liable until a demand is actually made, because the note must have been understood to be a continuing obligation;24 but this rule is denied in toto by some authority.25 Another exception as to a demand exists in some jurisdictions as to demand of payment where the parties are farmers. A demand upon the next occasion when a farmer may be expected to desert the plough, such as court day or muster day, is considered sufficient.26 But other courts incline to think that a farmer is a business man and that the necessity of a journey into the country is not an excuse for non-presentment on the day of maturity.27 Notes that are due upon a certain day must be demanded upon that day, making allowance for days of grace if the note is entitled thereto.28 A failure to demand upon the last day of grace,29 or a day later under the usage of banks,30 exonerates the indorser, unless he is an indorser before delivery of the note,31 or unless he has assented to a postponement,32 or waived a demand.33 It seems to have been held that a demand need not have been made upon the day of maturity if the maker lives at a distance,34 but the true rule is that it should be so made. The reason offered is that the holder cannot assume until the close of the day of maturity so See Sec. 261, post. that the maker does not intend to pay. But if for any sufficient reason a demand cannot be made at maturity, a demand must be made as soon thereafter as practicable.35 The effect of war or epidemic in exercising a delay will be noticed later.36 A delay in the postoffice is not to be imputed to the holder,37 nor is a delay rendered necessary through a loss of the note.38 But the inability to cross a river,89 or the occurrence of a hard rain not rendering roads impassable,40 or a violent storm rendering travel difficult,41 is not an excuse for a total failure to present for payment. In such or similar cases the rule is that if the demand is rendered impossible at the time of maturity, a demand should be made as soon thereafter as practicable. The mere absence of the indorser is no excuse for not making the demand, since his presence is not at all necessary.42

27 Edgar v. Greer, 8 Iowa, 394; Jones v. Fales, 4 Mass. 245: Leavitt v. Simes, 3 N. H. 14: Hough v. Young, 1 Ohio, 230; "Windham Bank v. Norton, 22 Conn. 213; Piatt v. Eads, 1 Blackf. 63.

28 See cases in last note.

29 Perry v. Green, 19 N. J. Law, 61, a case on a note. This question could not arise on unaccepted bills of exchanga But this would be the rule on accepted bills. See the next note.

30 Bell v. First Nat. Bank, 115 U. S. 373. See Kenner v. Creditors, 7 Mart. (N. S.) 540.

1 Martin v. Winslow, 2 Mason, 241; Mudd v. Harper, 1 Md. 110; Perry v. Green, 19 N. J. Law, 61; Lock-wood v. Crawford, 18 Conn. 361; Alexander v. Parsons, 3 Lans. 333. a note payable one day after sight; Bassenhorst v. Wilby, 45 Ohio St 333.

2Rice v. Wesson, 11 Met 400; Warner v. Citizens' Bank, 6 S. D. 152; Verder v. Verder, 63 Vt 88. Sometimes the statute is simply declaratory of the common law (Davis v. Herrick, 6 Ohio, 55), but this statute applied to all notes.

3 See the first two cases in the last note; and the decision in the other case in the last note held that a delay of eight days was not reasonable.

4 Losse v. Dunkin, 7 Johns. 70. See Vreeland v. Hyde, 2 N. Y. Super. Ct. 429 (a note not for business purposes, where a more liberal rule was applied).

5Griffin v. Goff, 12 Johns. 423; Renner v. Bank of Columbia, 9 Wheat. 581.

6 See the cases in the next two notes and Peet v. Zanders, 6 La-Ann. 364

7 Edgar v. Greer, 8 Iowa, 394; Griffin v. Goff, 12 Johns. 423; Jones v. Fales, 4 Mass. 245; Leavitt v. Simes, 3 N. H. 14; Hough v. Young, 1 Ohio. 504.

8 Renner v. Bank of Columbia, 9 Wheat. 581; Magruder v. Bank of Washington, 9 Wheat. 598.

9 See Sec. 261, post. 10Camp v. Scott, 14 Vt 387. 11 See last note.

12Laughlin v. Marshall, 19 I11. 390, certificate of deposit.

13 Keyes v. Fenstermaker, 24 Cal. 329.

14 Sice v. Cunningham, 1 Cow. 397.

15 Martin v. Winslow, 2 Mason, 241. 16Field v. Nickerson, 13 Mass. 131.

17 Jerome v. Stebbins, 14 Cal. 457.

18 Good v. Arrowsmith, Anth. N. P. 289.

19 In re Crawford, Fed. Cas. No.

20 In re Grant, Fed. Cas. No. 5691.

3364. A register in bankruptcy had had the marvelous hardihood to decide that four years was a reasonable time.

21 Lindsey v. McClelland, 18 Wis. 481, certificate of deposit.

22 Seaver v. Lincoln, 21 Pick. 267.

23 Rice v. Wesson, 11 Met. 400, semble.

24 Wethey v. Andrews, 3 Hill, 582; Weeks v. Pry or, 27 Barb. 79; Salmon v. Grosvenor, 66 Barb. 160; Merritt v. Todd, 23 N. Y. 28. See Crim v. Starkweather, 88 N. Y. 339; Sice v. Cunningham, 1 Cow. 397.

25 Verder v. Verder, 63 Vt. 38.

26 Brown v. Johnston, 12 N. C. 293. 27Kiddell v. Ford, 2 Treadw. Const. 678.

28 See notes 5, 6 and 8, supra.

29 The demand may be at any time on that day at a proper hour. Estes v. Tower, 102 Mass. 65; Gordon v. Parmlee, 15 Gray, 413.

31 See Sec. Sec. 236 and 240, ante.

32 Lockwood v. Crawford, 18 Conn. 361.

33 See Sec. 293 et seq., post.

34 Freeman v. Boynton, 7 Mass. 483: Haddock v. Murray, 1 N. H. 140.