The question of notice to an indorser is never one of the actual receipt of notice, except where the server has failed to exercise due diligence in the manner of service.1 Assuming the server not to know the present address or residence or place of business of the person to be served, and eliminating the cases where the place of service has been designated,2 a duty devolves upon the server to ascertain the address if he can do so by the exercise of due diligence.3 The server may never have known any address, or he may not know the address on account of a change of residence, of which he has information.4 It perhaps needs not be stated that if the server, knowing the right address, serves at a wrong one, the notice is not good;5 or if, having information, he does not act upon it to the best of his knowledge, the notice will not be sufficient.6 The test of reasonable diligence has been defined to be the amount of care a reasonably prudent man of business would exercise in regard to matters upon which he desired to act with correct information.7 "Whether or not these phrases define anything at all more than the fact that the standard of the law is a reasonably prudent man it is difficult to say, but they have at least received the full meed of judicial approbation. From the decisions a number of rules for the determination of correct diligence can be derived, but the application of them will vary with varying circumstances. For after all, due diligence is an ultimate fact to be gathered from the probative facts in evidence. If those facts are in dispute, the question of due diligence, in this case as in all others, is one for the jury under cautionary instructions from the court. If the facts are such that reasonable men might differ in regard to the conclusion from them of due diligence, the question is none the less a matter for the jury. If the facts, however, are undisputed and the matter is one about which reasonable men could not differ, the question is one for the court.

20Beier v. Strauss, 54 Md. 278.

21 Bliss v. Nichols, 94 Mass. 443. See Blakeley v. Grant, 6 Mass. 386.

22Cadillon v. Rodriguez, 25 La. Ann. 79; Thomas v. Marsh, 2 La. Ann. 353; First Nat. Bank v. Wood, 51 Vt 471; Moreland v. Citizens' Sav. Bank, 97 Ky. 211; Matthewson v. Stafford Bank, 45 N. H. 104; Bank of U. S. v. Corcoran, 2 Pet. 121.

1 See cases in note 22 to last section, and Hitner v. Finney, 1 Wkly. Notes Cas. 50. The question of due diligence is to be determined by what was done, not by information received after the fact. Brighton Market Bank v. Philbrick, 40 N. H. 506.

2 See Sec. 235, ante.

3 See the cases in note 1, supra, and note 18 to last section.

4 This requires due diligence in inquiring.

5 Bacon v. Hanna, 137 N. Y. 379.

6 Randall v. Smith, 34 Barb. 452. And see Bacon v. Hanna, supra, where the address was upon an old note, of which the particular note was a renewal.

Assuming now that the server of notice has inquired of the owner, and the holder of the paper has no knowledge as to the place of residence of the indorser or drawer, he must govern himself by making proper inquiries. He cannot assume that the indorser has retained a residence which he had some considerable time prior to the date of indorsing;8 although, as we have said, he may assume that the residence at the time of indorsement or drawing has been retained.9 If he has reasonable ground to think that he knows the residence or has ascertained it, he exercises due diligence in acting upon his belief.10 Subject to this presumption he should examine the paper itself. If it be payable at a particular place, aj a bank, inquiries must be made at that place.11 He may act upon information received there if it indicates the residence of the person to be charged.12 If he does not receive sufficient information there he should inquire of the parties to the paper, such as the maker or drawer or other indorsers;13 he cannot rest upon the bank's lack of information as to the residence. If it be the drawer he is seeking, however, he may not address him at the place where the bill is drawn without inquiry,14 according to some authority, but may do so without further inquiry, according to other authority.15 Where the paper is not payable at a particular place, if it be a note he should inquire of the maker or of the other parties, if he knows the residences of those parties.16 He is justified in acting upon the information indicating the residence which he receives,17 even though the information be incorrect; as, for example, where another person had the same name.18 But information from a casual stranger (this term is used for want of a better), which turns out to be incorrect owing to the identity of names, ought not to have been acted upon.19 But this seems to be an instance of ex post facto wisdom. If information be not received in the preceding manner, inquiry should be made from those who are most likely to know where the person to be charged is,20 and if information is obtained from such persons it may be acted upon.21 If the information received indicates a residence in some other place than where the server lives, he mails the notice accordingly.22 But it would not be safe to follow any other method without inquiry, such as mailing to the indorser directly to the place where the note is dated,23 or mailing directly to the drawer or indorser at the place where the bill is drawn.24 Nor if the paper is payable at a particular placer can the notice be left there or mailed to that place, without inquiry for the drawer or indorser.25

7 Palmer v. Whitney, 21 Ind. 58.

8 Planters' Bank v. Bradford, 4 Humph. 39.

9 See the preceding section. 10Barr v. Marsh, 9 Yerg. 253;

Palmer v. Whitney, 21 Ind. 58; Wood v. Corl, 4 Met. 203.

11 Goodloe v. Godley, 13 Smedes & M 233.

12 Herbert v. Servin, 4 N. J. Law, 225; Hunt v. Nugent, 10 Smedes & M. 541; Cabot Bank v. Eussell, 4 Gray, 167.