It is scarcely possible, indeed, to imagine a great joy expressing itself in audible laughter, or even in the unvoiced smile. Indeed, we naturally think of great joy as silent. Even the pleasant gladdening feelings of the mind, say on the receipt of good news about one who is dear to us and who has been in peril, are quiet and restrained. The face may be radiant with happiness - may be all aglow from the thrill the good news has caused - but there are none of the foldings and commotions which constitute smiling. The same thing extends to tickling. I have pointed out that it is quite necessary that the touch be light. We cannot be tickled by blows - not even by firm pressure.

(33) In a study of the general causes of laughter, the causes of the laughter of children become instructive. I do not refer to infants, but to children of seven or eight, who laugh so often and so much.

In the Century Magazine (1902) Katherine A. Chandler tells of the efforts of a teacher in a large Primary Public School of America to discover what provoked mirth and laughter in her pupils between the ages of eight and fifteen. The conclusion to which general observation had previously led her was that the ' mortification, or discomfort, or hoaxing of others' very readily caused laughter, while a witty or funny remark often passed unnoticed. But she put her loosely formed general conclusion to an ingeniously devised test. A week after a time of holiday she asked all grades of her pupils between the ages of eight and fifteen, as a regular language exercise, ' to describe the best joke heard during vacation.' The children of eight, without exception, described some action, in which they had personally participated, embodying the idea of discomfort to somebody. The other pupils, as they rose in age, described with some frequency jokes which were less personal, and in which the discomfort of others did not appear. But the boys, up to the highest age, namely fifteen, continued with frequency to find their good jokes in having done something which made their sisters or other girls look ridiculous. Punning, Irish bulls, and the odd sayings of quite young children turned up, but only occasionally, in the jokes described by the oldest of the pupils.

(34) This interesting American experiment reveals a truth about laughter. Young persons readily discover what is comic in the misfortunes and discomfort of others. The first jokes which strike children relate largely to the upset of personal dignity, or to mishaps of some kind to others. But laughter with this origin is also far from uncommon in adult life, and all of us have frequently occasion to be ashamed of it. The following may be given as an illustration. A short, bald-headed, oldish man has his well-groomed silk hat blown off his head on a day of rain and wind. It goes careering along a slushy street, and the owner starts in pursuit. It halts for a moment, and his hand all but catches it, when a fresh gust sends it on over the wet road. All the passers-by, men and women, young, middle-aged, and old, stop to witness and enjoy the fun, and when the hat jinks him, if 1 may use such a word, as he almost catches it, there is loud laughing all round. But there is not a trace of smiling on the man's own face. He is conscious that he is cutting a ridiculous figure. He knows that the crowd of onlookers have no thought of pity for him. Indeed he is assured of this by their voiced laughter.

(35) Laughing at the discomfort of others therefore by no means belongs exclusively to children. It has been correctly said that scarcely any grown-up person can boast that it is wholly absent from hi3 own experience. It is the schadenfreude of the German tongue - pleasure in the pain of others - malignant, joy, as Hilpert translates the word. It is pleasant to know that few languages have a word to name it, but the thing exists everywhere. Among all the peoples of the earth, the sight of discomfort in others may in certain circumstances provoke laughter,-may provoke that which we ordinarily regard as the expression of merriment and joy.

But, as has already been pointed out, the discomfort or distress, which does this, must never be grave or serious. Hard pressure on the sole of the foot does not tickle nor cause laughter, and in like manner the sight of suffering, which is great and grave, never presents itself as ludicrous and never incites to laughter. In a railway collision, bringing death to many and agony to many more, there is not a face among those who have escaped injury that is not blanched and solemn. Nothing ludicrous is seen by any one, though much that is really ludicrous may have occurred, and days after may be remembered and laughed over. On the spot - at the time - all that is seen is an appalling disaster.

Aristotle says that the ridiculous is 'what is out of time and place, without danger.' It is quite necessary that it be without danger. There being nothing dangerous - that word covering all that is serious or grave - our sense of the ridiculous may be outwardly expressed in what Emerson describes as ' the pleasant spasm we call laughter.' This is a kindly way of describing laughter, to which it is not much accustomed. Even from Emerson's pen, ' the pleasant spasm ' elsewhere becomes 'the contemptible squeal of joy.' He makes it 'a rule of manners to avoid all exaggeration/ and he treats loud laughter as such an exaggeration. Explosions of it, he says, should be under strict control, and he quotes Lord Chesterfield as saying: 'I am sure that since 1 had the use of my reason, no human being has ever heard me laugh.' Such sayings only show the position of doubtful dignity and respectability, which is often assigned to laughter, for reasons which are not difficult to find; but most men will be of opinion that a world full of Chesterfields would be a very sickly world, and that laughing, even though it may not be always quite proper and respectable at its core, improves the use of reason.