'In dreams, one sees perfectly, hears rarely, reasons not at all, feels acutely; images and sensations succeed each other without any comparison or hinging together on the part of the soul. Sensations are experienced, but not ideas, inasmuch as ideas are but the comparison of sensation; dreams, therefore, reside only in the interior material sense, and the soul has nothing to do with them. They partake only of the animal memory - of the material reminiscence. Memory, on the other hand, cannot exist without the idea of time - without the comparison of antecedent with present ideas; and seeing that these ideas do not enter into dreams, it appears to be demonstrated that they cannot be either a consequence, or an effect, or a proof of memory.......We remember our dreams for the same reason that we remember the sensations we have only just experienced; and the only difference there is between the animals and ourselves, is, that we perfectly distinguish what belongs to our dreams from what appertains to our ideas, or our real sensations - and this is a comparison, an operation of the memory, into which the idea of time enters. Animals, on the contrary, who are deprived of memory and of this power of comparing spaces of time, are unable to distinguish their dreams from their real sensations, and they believe that what they have dreamed has really happened.

'I believe I have already proved, in what I have written upon the Nature of Man, that animals have not the power to reflect. Now the understanding is not only a faculty of this power of reflection, but is itself the exercise of this power - it is its result, and the means by which it is manifested; only we ought to distinguish in the understanding two different operations, of which the first serves as a foundation for the second, and of necessity precedes it. This first action of the power of reflection is to compare sensations, and out of them to combine ideas; and the second is to compare the ideas themselves, and upon them to found arguments. By the first of these operations we acquire particular ideas, and such as suffice for our knowledge of all sensible objects; by the second, we raise ourselves to general ideas, which are necessary to enable us to arrive at the knowledge of abstractions. Animals have neither the one nor the other of these faculties, because they have not under-standing; and the understanding of most men appears to have been arrested at the first of these operations.' - Natural History. Treatise upon Animals.