Where, upon a purchase, either by one or several, the conveyance is taken in the names of strangers; or where, in the case of a joint-purchase, the conveyance is taken in the names of some, but not all, of the purchasers who pay for the estate (a), there will, - subject to the exceptions subsequently noticed, and subject, of course, to any express stipulation (even by parol) on the point (b), - be a resulting trust in favour of the other parties who have paid or helped to pay the consideration-money: and this, whatever may be the tenure of the estate, or the mode in which the property is conveyed (c); unless the effect would be to break in upon the policy of an Act of Parliament (d): and no written declaration of trust is necessary; resulting trusts being expressly excluded from the operation of the Statute of Frauds (e). But, it is conceived, the mere fact of the money being so paid, not in pursuance of the original agreement, but either as a matter of necessity, or by virtue of a pecuniary arrangement between the parties at the time of completion, would not have this effect (f): if, for instance, A. and B. agree to purchase an estate, the money as between themselves to be advanced in certain specified proportions, and, at the time fixed for completion, A., either through B.'s temporary inability to pay, or merely for his convenience, advance the entire amount, this, it appears, will not give A. a claim to the whole estate (g).

So, if consideration has been paid by others than nominal purchasers, there will be a resulting trust without writing.

(u) Forster v. Hale, 3 Ves. 696; S. C., 5 Ves. 308.

(w) Dale v. Hamilton, 2 Ph. 266.

(x) Sug. 907.

(y) Per Lord Cottenham, 2 Ph.

275; See Donohoe v. Conrahy, 2 J. & L. 688.

(z) 2 Ph. 275.

(a) Wray v. Steele, 2 Ves. & B. 388.

A manorial custom that a nominal purchaser of copyholds shall, not withstanding the doctrine of resulting trusts, take beneficially unless the trust is mentioned on the Rolls of the Manor, is a bad custom (h).

For the purpose of raising a resulting trust, the mode in which the consideration has been paid may be proved by parol evidence, either during the life of the nominal purchaser, or, according to the weight of authority, after his decease (?); though whether it can prevail against a direct denial in his answer seems to be doubtful (k); and it will, in any case, be received with great caution: nor can it be received to prove that a person who has paid for the estate with his own money, and taken a conveyance in his own name, was, in fact, the agent of another (l); or to raise a resulting trust in favour of a vendor who has conveyed the estate without receiving the purchase-money; even although there be parol evidence to show that the transaction was really a conveyance in trust, and not a sale (m). But where such evidence is received it need not be confined to the direct fact of payment: for instance, evidence of the poverty of the nominal purchaser has been allowed in proof of the impossibility of his having paid for the estate (n).

Custom, negativing the doctrine of resulting trusts, is bad.

Payment of consideration may be proved by parol evidence.

(b) See Lady Bellasis v. Compton, 2 Vern. 294.

(c) See Dyer v. Dyer, 2 Cox, 92, 93.

(d) See Sug. 908.

(e) 29 Car. II. c. 3, s. 8.

(f) See Wood v. Birch, Sug. 905.

(g) S. C.

(h) See Lewis v. Lane, 2 Myl. & K. 449, over-ruling Edwards v. Fidel, 3 Madd. 237.

(i) See Sir Thomas Peechy's Case,

And parol evidence is admissible to prove that what purports to be an absolute conveyance, was, in fact, a mortgage (o).

As a general rule, no resulting trust arises when the conveyance is taken in the name of a child (p), grandchild (q) (if the father be dead) (r), or wife (s) of a sole (t) purchaser; or in the names of several children, either alone (u) or associated with the wife (w): and the rule seems to include illegitimate children, if recognised as such (x); and persons to whom the purchaser has placed himself in loco parentis (y); and adult (z) as well as infant, and male as well as female children; and to extend to purchases by a female as well as by a male ancestor or quasi ancestor (a): but not to purchases in the name of a parent (b), brother (c), or other remoter relative.

Conveyance may be shown to be a mortgage.

But, prima facie, there is no resulting trust on purchase in name of wife or child.

Sug. 910; Lench v. Lench, 10 Ves. 511, 517; 2 Mad. Ch. Pr. 141, 3rd edit.

(k) Sug. 909.

(l) Bartlett v. Pickersgill, 1 Cox, 15.

(m) Leman v. Whitley, 4 Russ. 423; Sir E. Sugden puts a quaery to this case, Sug. 911.

(n) Willis v. Willis, 2 Atk. 71.

(o) Cripps v. Jee, 4 Bro. C. C. 472.

(p) Mumma v. Mumma, 2 Vern. 19; Grey v. Grey, 2 Sw. 594; Sid-mouth v. Sidmouth, 2 Beav. 447.

(q) See Kilpin v. Kilpin, 1 Myl. & K. 520; Loyd v. Read, 1 P. Wms. G07.

(r) Ebrand v. Dancer, 2 Ch. Ca.26.

(s) Glaister v. Hewer, 8 Ves. 199.

(t) See Finch v. Finch, 15 Ves. 51.

(m) S. C, ib. 43; Murless v. Franklin, 1 Sw. 13.

(w) Back v. Andrews, 2 Vern. 120.

(x) See Beckford v. Beckford, Loft. 490; and see 1 Myl. & K. 542.

(y) See Ebrand v. Dancer, 2 Ch. Ca.26; Currant v. Jago, 1 Col. 261; a person may stand in loco parentis to but not by subsequent acts or declarations of purchaser; - aliter of nominee.

And, although the point was otherwise decided by Lord Hardwicke (d), it seems to be the better opinion (e) that the same rule will prevail, when, upon a purchase by a father, the conveyance is taken in the joint names of himself and his child (f); so, in the case of copyholds, the children take beneficially, although they are named to take in succession after the father (g); so, on a purchase by a husband in the joint names of himself and his wife, the latter surviving will take beneficially (h); so, if a stranger's name be also inserted, he will, it appears, take as a trustee for the children or wife, (as the case may be) (i).