A solicitor is said to be liable to his client for any loss which may be occasioned by his omission to make any one of the numerous searches which, may by possibility disclose matter affecting the title (q); unless, however, special circumstances render such a course expedient, it is not usual for conveyancing counsel to direct a search for more than judgments, crown debts and accountantships, and lis pendens, and also a general search in the County Register (if any), and in the Manorial Court Rolls, (if the property is copyhold;) and it may be doubted whether a solicitor would be liable for an omission which is sanctioned by general practice: at any rate, it is conceived, that where the title is laid before counsel, who advises a search for certain specified incumbrances, the solicitor need not make a more extensive search unless aware of some particular reason for so doing.

Liability of trustee giving wrong information.

Inquiry of tenants.

Liability of solicitor omitting to search for incum. brances, etc.

(g) Jones v. Jones, 8 Sim. 633; Wiltshire v. Rabbits, 14 Sim. 76; Wilmot v. Pike, 5 Ha. 14.

(h) Burrowes v. Lock, 10 Ves. 470.

(i) Ibid, p. 476.

(k) Ibid. p. 475.

(l) Daniels v. Davidson, 16 Ves.249

(m) 1 Jarm. Conv. by S. 119.

(n) Nelthorpe v. Holgate, 1 Coll. 203.

(o) 1 Ha. 62; but see Penny v. Watts, 1 Mac. & G. 150.

(p) Miles v. Langley, 1 Russ. & M. 39.

Of these searches, the most generally important is that for judgments; to understand the necessity for which, it will be necessary to consider briefly the old law, as it existed prior to the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, and the alterations which have been introduced by that statute.

And here it may be proper to observe, that as against purchasers or mortgagees who advance their money without notice of subsisting judgments, the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, is rendered a dead letter by the subsequent Act of 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11, (except, perhaps, as respects judgments in the Palatinate Courts:) so that, as respects such purchasers and mortgagees, the Law as it existed before the passing of the former Act, is, with the above exception, alone important; nor does registration under that Act amount to notice (r): at the same time it is inexpedient to rely upon any presumed want of notice (s), (especially where the same solicitor acts for both parties;) and the propriety of a search by an intended purchaser or mortgagee, may, practically, be considered chiefly with reference to the extended effect of judgments under the new law.

As to searching for judgments - general law respecting.

As respects purchasers, etc, without notice, law remains as before 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110.

But want of notice cannot be relied on in practice.

(q) 1 Jarm. Conv. 104. (r) See and consider 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11, s. 5.

(s) For this, among other reasons, viz.: that if judgments exist, and are discovered by a sub-purchaser upon a re-sale, it may be impossible to satisfy him of the original want of notice.

Upon an elegit, under the old law, the judgment creditor might take in execution a moiety, (or under two judgments of the same term an entirety,) of the following property of his debtor (t); viz., freeholds, land held in ancient demesne, rent-charges, estates granted by the Crown for the maintenance of dignities, impropriate tithes, and terms of years, including, (probably,) leases of copyholds granted by license of the lord, or, (it is conceived,) under a special custom; and this, whether the same respectively were held in severalty, coparcenery, or in common.

The right affected reversions, estates held by a husband during coverture or by the curtesy, estates tail during the life of tenant in tail, and estates held in joint-tenancy during the life of the joint-tenant.

And, as to terms of years, either the moiety might be extended upon a single writ, or the entirety might be sold as part of the debtor's chattels.

And, under the Statute of Frauds, the legal rights of the creditor were extended to estates of which a trustee was seised simply in trust for the debtor at the time of execution sued (u); this provision, it will be observed, does not affect trusts of terms for years, nor has it been held to affect equities of redemption, or any equitable estate in which the debtor has not the sole beneficial interest (v).

But advowsons in gross, glebe, rents-seck, and copyholds (except as respects leases thereof) are not extendible under the old law; nor are the lands of a tenant in tail, or joint-tenant, so extendible, except for his life (w).

And it seems doubtful whether the exemption of copyholds extended to customary freeholds (x), Nor, as against purchasers (y), was a term for years bound, until the writ was delivered to the sheriff (z).

Judgments under old law, what they affected.

What they did not affect.

(t) Prid. on J. 7, 8, 9. (u) Ibid. 15. (v) Ibid. 18.

(w) Ibid. 8.

(x) See Scriv. on Copyholds, 570.

And in order that a judgment might be binding as against purchasers or mortgagees, it had to be docketed under the Act of William and Mary; and, (if intended to affect land in a Register County,) entered in the local register (a).

The omission to docket or register, was, however, immaterial in Equity, if a purchaser or mortgagee advanced his money with actual notice, (either to himself or his agent,) of the judgment (b).

And Equity would assist a judgment creditor to the partial equitable interest of his debtor, in those cases in which he would have been entitled to execution under the Statute of Frauds in case the debtor had owned the entire beneficial interest (c); but he was obliged to sue out an elegit before filing his bill (d).

But the judgment creditor acquired no preference in bankruptcy, unless execution had been sued before the issuing of the fiat or commission (e).

It followed, from what has been above stated, that a purchaser who, before execution sued (f), got in an outstanding legal estate, (even a mere satisfied term,) or procured a declaration of trust in his favour by the trustee, or who, (as in the case of a mortgagee purchasing the equity of redemption,) was himself seised or possessed of the legal estate, was protected from judgments of which he had no notice (g) at the time of his purchase; but of course, where the outstanding estate was less than the fee simple, it was no protection against subsisting judgments of a date prior to its creation; and the want of notice was essential in Equity.