What circumstances will deprive the heir of his special protection- rules laid down in King v. Hamlet.

Sir. E. Sug-den's comments thereon.

(t) Addis v. Campbell, 4 Beav.401; but the case would be different if the sub-purchaser had no notice of the original fraud, even although he might not have acquired the legal estate; see Nagle v. Baylor, 3 Dru. & W. 60; see too Sibbering v. Earl of Balcarres, 14 Jur. 753, V. C. K. B.

(u) King v. Hamlet, 2 Myl. & K. see p. 473.

(v) Sug. 316.

(to) Edwards v. Browne, 2 Coll. 100; and see Playford v. Playford, 4 Ha. 546.

(x) Sug. 316. As to transactions in the nature of family arrangements between father (tenant for life) and son (tenant in tail), see Bellamy v. Sabine, 2 Ph. 425; Lord Aldborough v. Trye, 7 Cl. & Fin. 436; Cooke v. Burtchaell, 2 Dru. & W. 165; see also, as to family arrangements generally, Farmer v. Farmer, 1 H. L. C. 724; and Persse v. Persse, 7 Cl. & Fin. 279; Westby v. Westby, 2 Dru. & W. 502; such arrangements are exempt from the strict rules applicable to cases between ordinary vendors and purchasers: see a case of such an arrangement being set aside, Sturge v. Sturge, 14 Jur. 159.

The question of adequacy of consideration must be determined with reference to circumstances as existing at the date of the contract, and not to subsequent events (y): it was formerly held (z) sufficient to avoid the transaction, that the price paid was not the estimated value according to the tables used by actuaries; but subsequent decisions and authorities seem to have established the more reasonable doctrine, that the market value, (which is generally about two-thirds of the estimated value (a),) is alone to be regarded (b): and, on a bona fide sale by auction, its result is considered in itself to fix the market value (c). In a late case, where the market value appeared to have been rather better than 1900l., and the price paid was 1700l., the Court held, that the inadequacy was sufficient to entitle the vendor to relief (d).

It was held in a modern case, that where goods are sold to a person in distressed circumstances by a tradesman, who knows that they are bought merely with a view to raise money by selling them again, and they are charged at fair and reasonable prices, and the purchaser, by way of security for the price, mortgages his reversionary interests as expectant heir, the Court will not set aside the securities (e). In an earlier bond, given for silks taken up to sell to raise money, was allowed to stand as a security only for the sum really raised (f); but the decision turned upon the transaction being a loan at usurious interest: the transfer of goods being a shift or cloak for usury (g).

Adequacy of consideration, how determined.

Security for price of goods bought to resell and so raise money supported.

(y) Gowland v. Be Faria, 17 Ves. 20.

(z) S. C.; and see Peacock v. Evans, 16 Ves. 512. (a) See Potts v. Curtis, You. 543.

(b) Lord Aldborough v. Trye, 7 Cl. & Fin. 436; Hincksman v. Smith, 3 Russ. see p. 435; Headen v. Rosher, 1 M'Clel. & Y. 89; Potts v. Curtis, You. 543; Wardle v. Carter, 7 Sim. 490; see Sewell v. Walker, 12 Jur. 1041.

(c) Shelly v. Nash, 3 Madd. 232; Fox v. Wright, 6 Madd. 111; Lord Aldborough v. Trye, 7 Cl. & Fin. 436.

(d) Edwards v. Browne, 2 Coll. 100.

It would seem that where fraud has been practised on a tenant in tail, and has been carried into effect by barring the entail, and he dies without issue, and without confirming the transaction, the next remainderman may file a bill to set it aside; but not if there were an independent intention to bar the entail, and the fraud applied only to some part of the transaction distinct from that object (h).

When relief is given, the conveyance will stand as a security for the principal sum and simple (but not compound (i)) interest (k); and for moneys expended by him in lasting and valuable improvements, and interest (I); he will, of course, be charged with what he has actually received, and interest; and, in one case, where he had received from the vendor interest on the purchase-money, such payments were held to have been in reduction of the principal, and he himself was charged with interest upon them (m); and it seems doubtful whether he will not, like a mortgagee, be charged with what without wilful default he might have received (n): where inadequacy of price is the sole ground for the interference of the Court, he may be allowed his costs (o): but slight additional circumstances will induce the Court to refuse them (p).

When sale fraudulent as against tenant in tail will be set aside at suit of remainderman whom he might have barred.

Terms on which vendor is entitled to relief.

(e) King v. Hamlet, 2 Myl. & K. 456; 9 Bligh, 610; see Sir E. Sug-den's remarks, Sugden's Law of Property, 65 et seq.

(f) Barker v. Vansommer, l Bro. C.C. 149.

(g) Per Lord Brougham, C, 2 Myl. & K. 485.

(k) See Bellamy v. Sabine, 2 Ph. 425.

(i) Gowland v. Be Faria, 17 Ves. 20.

(k) s. c.

(1) Murray v. Palmer, 2 Sch. & Lef. 490.

(m) S. C., ib. 488.

(ft) See Sug. 327, and the judgment in Murray v. Palmer, 2 Sch. & Lef. 489, against such liability; but see contra the decree, ib. 490.

And, of course, long delay and clear (q) acquiescence on the part of the vendor, - (and this notwithstanding his poverty,) - or his advised confirmation of the purchase, will bar the right to relief (r): and we may here remark, that the statement of consideration in the conveyance is not conclusive, but any additional consideration, not inconsistent with the terms of the deed, may be established by parol evidence (s).