And to sue for breach of covenant.

To re-enter.

(r) Standen v. Chrismas, (1847) 10 Q. B. 135; 16 L. J. Q. B. 265.

(s) Sug. 14th ed. 181. As to the allegations necessary in a suit by an assignee of the reversion on covenants, see Philipps v. P., (1878) 4 Q. B. D. 127 ; 48 L. J. Q. B. 135 ; Davit v. James, (1884) 26 Ch. D. 778 ; 53 L. J. Ch. 523 ; Danford v. McAnulty, (1883) 8 A. C. 456 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 652.

(t) See Johnson v. St. Peter's, Hereford, (1836) 6 N. & M. 106, 115.

(u) Badeley v. Vigurs, (1854) 4 E. & B. 71; 23 L. J. Q. B. 377.

(x) Twynam v. Pickard, (1818) 2

B. & Ald. 106 ; and see Mayor of Swansea v. Thomas, (1882) 10 Q. B. D. 48; 52 L. J. Q. B. 340.

(y) Taite v. Gosling, (1879) 11 Ch. D. 273; 48 L. J. Ch. 397.

(z) Crane v. Batten, (1854) 23 L. T. (O. S.) 220 ; and see Hunt v. Remnant, (1854) 9 Ex. 635 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 135.

(a) S. 3 ; and inf. p. 825.

(b) Wright v. Burroughes, (1847) 4 D. & L. 438, see p. 448 ; 16 L. J.

C. P. 6 ; 32 Hen. 8, c. 34, applied only to leases by deed ; see Manchester Co. v. Coombs, 1901, 2 Ch. 608, 614, 615; 70 L. J. Ch. 814.

Under the Real Property Act, 1845, s. 9, where the immediate reversion on a lease is surrendered or merged after the 1st Oct., 1845, the next estate is to be deemed the reversion as respects both rights and liabilities; and this clause is retrospective (h).

Under the Law of Property Amendment Act, 1859, s. 3, where the reversion on a lease is severed, and the rent is legally apportioned (i), the assignee of each part of the reverNext estate is now the reversion.

(c) Wright v. Burrouc/hcs, sup.

(d) Crane v. Batten, sup.

(e) See 4 & 5 Anne, c. 3 (Ruff. 4 Anne, c. 16), s. 9 ; 1 Doug. 282 ; reporter's note to Brown v. Storey, (1840) 1 Man. & G. at p. 128 ; but see Towerson v. Jackson, 1891, 2 Q. B. 484; 61 L. J. Q. B. 36, in case of lease by mortgagor, and notice to tenant by mortgagee, overruling Brown v. Storey as to notice. See Doe v. Brown, (1853) 2 E. & B. 331. The statute gives no right where the person, who is the object of the suit, has no particular estate left in the land by reason of his having assigned his interest; Allcock v. Moorhouse, sion has, in respect of his apportioned rent, the benefit of the original conditions or powers of re-entry for non-payment (k). And, by ss. 1 and 2 of the same Act, a licence, or partial licence, to do any act which, without such licence, would create a forfeiture, or give a right to re-enter, does not destroy the right of re-entry in respect of any subsequent breach of condition by the licensee, or any breach by his co-lessee : by the Law of Property Amendment Act, 1860, s. 6, the effect of an actual waiver is confined to the particular breach to which the waiver specially relates.

(1882) 9 Q. B. D. 366

(f) Bickford v. Parson, (1848) 5 C. B. 920; 17 L. J. C. P. 193; Standen v. Chrismas, (1847) 10 Q. B. 135; 16 L. J. Q. B. 265.

(g) s. c.

(h) Upton v. Townend, (1855) 17 C. B. at p. 50 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 44. As to the remedies of remaindermen or reversioners on leases granted under powers, see Grecnaway v. Hart, (1854) 18 Jur. 449. See also Carson, R. P. Stats. 522.

(i) As to apportionment, see 1 Dav. p. 544 et seq. ; Hood & C. 6th ed. 54 : Carson, R, P. Stats. 527.

1). Vol. II

A subsisting tenancy, other than a tenancy at will, will continue after the purchase upon the same terms as previously, until it is regularly determined by either the purchaser or the tenant (/).

Tenancy continues until determined.

Where the purchaser is himself lessee, the execution of the conveyance at once determines all the covenants in the lease which subsisted between himself and the vendor as lessee and lessor (m). So, the purchase by a lessee of part only of the demised land, will destroy his right of pre-emption over the residue (;/).

Purchaser's rights and liabilities, as lessee, cease on conveyance.

The mere retention by the vendor of the actual possession of the property, after the execution of the conveyance, will not subject him to an action by the purchaser for use and occupation (o). If he make encroachments, these will presumably be for the benefit of the purchaser (p).

Vendor retaining possession, not liable for use and occupation.

Encroachment-.

The effect of a subsequent conveyance on the rights of a devisee of property contracted at the date of the will to be sold has been already mentioned (q).

Purchaser's will, how affected by conveyance.

(k) And see Conv. Act, 1881, ss. 10 - 12, as to leases made after 1881.

(l) Greenwood v. Bttirstow, (1836) 5 L. J.N. S. Ch. 179.

(m) Paton v. Brebner, (1819) 1 Bli. at p. 69 ; see Woodfall, L. & T. 17th ed. 345 - 347.

(n) Sparrow v. Cooper, (1833) Hay & J. 404 ; and sec sup., p. 312.

(o) Tea- v. Jones, (1844) 13 M. & W. 12 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 94 ; see sup., p. 517.

(p) Doc v. Tidbury, (1854) 14 C. B. 304 ; 23 L. J. C. P. 57. (g) See sup., p. 308.

Upon the purchase of an estate in mortgage, the debt as between the persons beneficially entitled to the purchaser's real and personal estate on his death, prima facie, and in the absence of evidence of a contrary intention, and even in cases not affected by the Real Estate Charges Act, 1854, remains primarily charged on the land. Such intention is not evidenced by a mere covenant with the mortgagor to pay the debt (s) ; nor does such a covenant create any personal liability to the mortgagee (t), nor come within the operation of a charge of debts in the purchaser's will (u). A similar covenant with the mortgagee may, perhaps, be sufficient for the purpose (.r) ; but the authorities do not clearly warrant this proposition in cases where the covenant is unaccompanied by a variation of the original contract for payment (y). A distinction, not altogether satisfactory, has been made between a contract for the purchase of the equity of redemption, and a contract for the purchase of the unencumbered estate at a price out of which the debt is eventually allowed in abatement; the personalty being, in the latter case, considered the primary fund (z) : but, in one case, where the estate was proposed to be conveyed free from the mortgage, and the mortgagee was made a party to the conveyance, but did not execute it or receive his money, the debt was held to be primarily charged on the land (a).