(r) Micklethwait v. Vincent, (1893) 69 L. T. 57.

(s) Nicoll v. Chambers, (1852) 11 C. B. 996; 21 L. J. C. P. 54; Farmer v. Turner, (1899) 15 T. L. R. 922.

(t) Lyford v. Coward, (1683) 1 Vern. 195; 2 Ca. in Ch. 150.

(u) Roe v. Ireland, (1809) 11 Ea. 280.

(x) Eccl. Commrs. v. Parr, 1894, 2 Q. B. 420; 63 L. J. Q. B. 784; Beighton v. B., (1895) W. N. 119; 64 L. J. Ch. 796; and see Re Lidiard and Jackson, (1889) 42 Ch. D. 254; 58 L. J. Ch. 785.

(y) Earl v. Baxter, (1799) 2 W. Bi. 1228; White v. Foljambe, (1805) 11 Ves. 337, 350. See L. P. Act, 1925, Pt. II. of 1st Sched.

(z) Doe v. Johnson, (1819) Gow, 173; Foljambe v. Smith's Tadcasler Brewery Co., (1904) 73 L. J. Oh. 722. (a) S. C.

The House of Lords has held that a parchment writing, purporting to be the first skin of an indenture consisting -originally of two or more skins, and severed by a sharp instrument, but which came from the proper custody, was properly received in evidence in ejectment; and that the mutilation of a deed forms an objection rather to the value than to the admissibility of the evidence (f). Livery of seisin (which has now been abolished (g)) has been presumed after twenty years' consistent possession (h). So, it will be presumed that persons who have executed an award under the general Inclosure Act, were regularly appointed and took the necessary oaths (i): and generally that persons who have acted in an official capacity were duly appointed (k).

Notwithstanding mutilation.

Livery of seisin.

Of appointment of Inclosure Commissioners.

As regards joint stock companies, persons dealing with them are bound to look at what may be called the "outside position" of the company, but not at their "indoor management" (l). By s. 74 of the L. P. Act, 1925, in favour of a purchaser, a deed (executed after 1925) is to be deemed to have been duly executed by a corporation aggregate if its seal be affixed thereto in the presence of and attested by its clerk, secretary or other permanent officer or his deputy, and a member of the board of directors, council, or other governing body of the corporation, and where a seal purporting to be the seal of a corporation has been affixed to a deed, attested by persons purporting to be persons holding such offices as aforesaid, the deed is to be deemed to have been executed in accordance with the requirements of this section, and to have taken effect accordinglv.

Of observance of forms by company.

(b) Taylor, 11th ed. p. 1244.

(c) Taylor, p. 150.

(d) Taylor, p. 163.

(e) Simmons v. Rudall, (1851) 1 Sim. N. S. 115; Taylor, p. 160.

(f) Roe d. Lord Trimlestown v. Kemmis, (1843) 9 C. & F. at pp. 773, 775.

(g) L. P. Act, 1925, s. 51 (1).

(h) Rees v. Lloyd, (1810) Wight. 123; and see Doe v. Gardiner, (1852) 12 C. B. at p. 333.

(i) Casamajor v. Strode, (1832) 5 Si. 87, 96; (1834) 2 M. & K. 706.

(k) Taylor, 11th ed. p. 165.

(l) County of Gloucester Bank v. Rudry Merthyr Colliery Co., 1895, 1 Ch. 629, 633; 64 L. J. Ch. 451; Ley v. Pullinger Engineering Co., 1921, 1 K. B. 77, 80; A. L. Underwood, Ltd. v. Bank of Liverpool, 1924, 1 K. B. 775, 787, 788.

21(2)

It will be presumed (in the absence of special circumstances (m)) that an instrument duly executed and which is lost, was also duly stamped (n), and that stamps, the amount of which is obliterated, were of the right amount (o). But the Court will not presume that forms have been complied with, which the legislature, upon grounds of general policy, has made essential to the validity of an instrument; as, for instance, the enrolment of the conveyance of an estate to trustees for a charity (p). Nor will the Court presume the surrender of a prior life estate in order to 6et up a recovery, on the mere ground that, without it, there would have been no valid tenant to the praecipe (q): nor from the fact that a deed more than thirty years old purported to be executed by attorney that the attorney was duly authorised (r).

Of deeds having been duly stamped.

But not of forms required by law on grounds of general policy.

(m) Smith v. Henley, (1844) 1 Ph. 391; 13 L. J. Ch. 221; Blair v. Ormond, (1847) 1 De G. & S. 428; Marine Investment Co. v. Haviside, (1872) L. R. 5 H. L. 624; 42 L. J. Ch. 173.

(n) Hart v. 27., (1841) 1 Ha. 1; 11 L. J. N. S. Ch. 9, and sec Hughes v. Clark, (1851) 15 Jur. 430; 17 L. T. (O. S.) 64, case of a counterpart lease; Closmadeuc v. Carrel, (1856) 18 C. B. 36; 25 L. J. C. P. 216; Taylor, 11th ed. 147; and see Re Halifax Banking Co. and Wood, (1898) 79 L. T. 536, where Chitty and Vaughan Williams. L. Jj., both appear to have considered that proof of stamping would be necessary; but this does not appear from the cases of Bryant v. Busk and Moulton v. Edmonds, which they professed to follow; see also-stamp Act, 1891, s. 117.

(o) Doe v. Coombs, (1842) 6 Jur. 930; 11 L. J. Q. B. 36.

(p) Doe v. Waterton, (1819) 3 B. & Ald. 149; Wright v. Smythies, (1809) 10 Ea. 409; Sed qu., see statement of Lindley, L. J., in Haigh-v. West, 1893, 2 Q. B. at p. 31; 62 L. J. Q. B. 532.

(q) Penny v. Allen, (1857) 7 D. M. & G. 409; 3 Jur. N. S. 273.

It may be stated as a general rule, as between vendor and purchaser, that the purchaser must admit, as presumptions, all matters which the Judge would clearly direct the jury to presume; but not matters as to which the Judge would leave it to the jury to pronounce upon the effect of the evidence (s).

General rule of presumption between vendor and purchaser.

As to the effect of recitals as evidence as between vendor and purchaser, gee L. P. Act, 1925, s. 45, sub-ss. (1) and (6), referred to supra, pp. 311, 312.

As to recitals, etc, under the L. P. Act, 1925.

As respects evidence upon matters of fact (other than documentary facts), it may be laid down as a general rule, that a purchaser can require evidence of all facts material to the title from the date of its commencement; that is, of all facts whose existence must be either proved or assumed in order to establish affirmatively the vendor's title, e.g., the heirship of a vendor who claims by descent; and of all facts the existence of which must be either proved or assumed in order to establish such title merely by displacing the known or presumptive title of others, e.g., the failure, determination, or release of some prior estate or incumbrance the existence of which is either known, or may be presumed as between vendor and purchaser: so also, he may require a satisfactory explanation of matters which tend to impeach the validity or sufficiency of the abstracted instruments (t).