Estate (Lat. status), in law, a term usually expressing an interest in lands, though in a general sense it is applied to both real and personal property, as we sometimes see in wills and the like. But when used with a discriminative signification to designate the nature and limit of the interest, it properly relates to lands only. There are several classes of estates. I. An estate of inheritance, which is sometimes expressed by the term fee. Thus when we say a man has the fee of lands, it is meant that he has an inheritable estate; and in the United States, where there is no limitation to particular heirs, it is understood to be the entire proprietorship of the lands. But in England there are estates of inheritance in fee simple and fee tail, the former being an estate which descends to a man's general heirs, the latter being limited to certain specified heirs, as for instance to a man's issue male or female, or to the heirs of his body begotten of a certain wife. By such limitations, although the estate descends to the particular heirs, yet failing them it reverts to the grantor or supposed original proprietor, instead of descending to a man's general heirs; and so far there is an obstruction in the enjoyment of the estate, because a man is perpetuated in and represented by his heirs.

In this sense a fee simple is deemed an absolute ownership, in distinction from a fee tail, which is limited in descent. Another distinction was more important, viz.: that while the former could be conveyed or devised, the latter in theory could not be, yet practically it could be alienated by a particular form of proceeding called a common recovery. Yet a fee simple is not necessarily the entire proprietorship, for it may be subject to encumbrances by mortgage or judgment and otherwise; and smaller estates, as a lease for years, may be carved out of it, though in such a case it would be more proper to call the principal estate a fee simple in reversion or remainder. There are also qualified or determinable estates of inheritance, by which is meant that the estate may be determined by some contingency, and yet the contingency may never happen, and therefore by possibility the estate will be perpetual. The illustrations of this species of inheritance are for the most part hypothetical, as to a man and his heirs so long as St. Paul's church shall stand. Sometimes the qualification is residence in a particular place.

Or again, there may be a restriction that the person taking the estate shall not marry, an instance of which we have in the case of a devise by a man to his wife on con-dition that she shall continue a widow. When by the limitation an estate is to last till a certain event, there is until the event happen an inheritance subject to being determined; though if the event become impossible, then the estate is converted into a fee simple absolute. A conveyance by the owner of a determinable fee will of course be subject to the disqualification or contingency upon which the estate depends. It may be a question, in the case of a limitation to a man and his heirs so long as they reside in a certain place, what the effect of alienation would be; but probably the same rule would apply, viz.: that it would be valid to the extent of the right which the grantee himself had, but would be defeated by a breach of the condition. If this would be inconsistent with the nature of the estate, the restriction would, it may be presumed, be void under the statutory rule which has been adopted in the state of New York, whereby the power of alienation cannot be suspended by any limitation or condition whatever for a longer period than two lives in being at the creation of the estate.

II. An estate for life may be either by express grant or by operation of law. Of the latter kind are dower and curtesy, the respective interests of the wife and husband, each in the lands of the other, in case of survivorship. Estates for life as well as inheritance are included in the common denomination of freehold (liberium tenementum); which term seems to have been derived from the ancient mode of conveyance, which was by livery of seisin, that is, delivery of possession according to the form of feudal investiture. Other estates which were of an inferior nature could be transferred without this formality. It was chiefly as a distinction from copyhold estates that the term was used. The copyhold was originally an estate at the mere will of the lord, but became established by prescription, the evidence of which was in the rolls of the courts baron, whence the estate was said to be held by copy of court roll; and although it thus became independent of the will of the lord, it was still deemed a base tenure, and the form of conveyance was by surrender to the lord, and a new grant by him to the alienee, admitting him to be tenant of the copyhold upon the same terms by which the estate had been formerly held.

An estate for life may be either for the life of the tenant himself or of another person. The latter is usually designated as an estate par autre vie. III. Estates less than freehold are for a term of years, or at will, or by sufferance. The first is for a definite period; but whatever may bo the length of the period, even if it should bo a thousand years, it is still inferior to a freehold, and is classed in law with chattel interests. Thus, on the death of a tenant, his lease is included with the personal property to be administered as assets, instead of going to the heir. An estate at will was when lands were occupied by the tenant with consent of the landlord, but without any agreement as to the time the tenant shall be permitted to remain. It can hardly bo said to exist at present, as the courts now hold a tenancy where no certain term is agreed upon to be from year to year, and reasonable notice must be given of the intention to terminate it. The circumstance that distinguishes the two kinds of tenancy is the reservation of a certain rent, which may be either by express agreement, or by implication from the receipt of rent. If a certain rent is payable, it constitutes an estate from year to year; but if neither rent nor time of occupation is specified, it is a tenancy at will.

An estate by sufferance is where the tenant has been in possession by lawful title, but wrongfully holds over after the determination of his interest. In such a case the tenant holds by the mere laches of the landlord, and is subject to being turned out by summary proceedings. But any act of the landlord affirming the wrongful holding, as receipt of rent, would convert the naked occupancy into a tenancy from year to year, and is then determinable only at the end of the year. The English statute of frauds (29 Charles II.), which has been generally reenacted in the United States, requires leases for a term of more than one year to be in writing; and in the state of New York and many other states a lease for a term exceeding three years must be recorded, or it will be inoperative against subsequent bona fide purchasers. Another distinction in the nature of estates has reference to the time when the right is reducible to possession. The right may exist prospectively, and it is then termed an estate in expectancy. It is of two kinds: one created by the act of parties, and called a remainder; the other by operation of law, and called a reversion.

An estate in remainder is what remains after a particular estate, either for years or life, to take effect in possession immediately after such estate, and must be created at the same time, though limited to commence in possession at a future time. Thus if a life estate be granted to A, with remainder to B for life, and remainder to 0 in fee, here are two remainders to commence in future, and the whole property constitutes but one estate. Yet in ordinary phraseology, where there is but one remainder including the whole residue of the estate, the fee is said to be in the person to whom such limitation is made. An estate in reversion is the residue of an estate left in the grantor or his heirs or in the heirs of a testator after the determination of a particular estate granted or devised. The estate reverts by operation of law, and a reservation to the grantor by the deed would have no effect, being only what the law itself prescribes. A contingent remainder is when the limitation depends upon a contingency which is uncertain or may not occur till after the determination of the particular estate; though it is held that such contingency must not be a remote possibility, as if the limitation should be to the heirs of a child not yet born.

A single illustration of this kind of estate will be sufficient. If a grant be made to A for life, with remainder to the heirs of B, and B should survive A, inasmuch as he cannot have heirs while living, the remainder would fail; but if the limitation be to A and B during their joint lives, with remainder to the survivor, here the remainder will take effect, though it is uncertain as to the person who will have the benefit of it. An executory devise is a disposition of an estate by will which would not be valid if made by deed, as a limitation of a contingent remainder. The distinction is that the remainder must take effect immediately upon the determination of the par-ticular estate or not at all; whereas an executory devise is good without a particular estate to support it. Thus if a devise be made to A, to take effect on his marriage, in this case until such marriage the fee descends to the heir at law, subject to being divested by the performance of the condition. There is still another distinction of estates growing out of the nature of the possession, under which head are classed joint tenancy, tenancy in common, and copar-cenary. The last of these, which is a descent of an inheritance to female heirs, in which case they take an equal interest in the entire estate, but without being subject to the rule which applied to joint tenancy as to the right of the survivor to the whole, does not exist in the United States, at least is not distinguishable from a tenancy in common.

So joint tenancy, the peculiar feature of which is that the whole estate vests in the survivor, has been abolished in this country, except in respect to executors and other trustees and mortgagees, and except also when it is expressly declared in the deed or will creating the estate that it is to be held in joint tenancy. In all other cases, where there is a possession of lands by several persons without any separation into specific parts, it is a tenancy in common; and it is not necessary that they should all hold by the same title, or have an equal interest; it is sufficient if each has an interest, and that it is undivided. Such an interest can be conveyed or devised, the same as property held in severalty, and partition may be compelled by either party on application to a competent court. Various equitable interests in lands will be discussed in the article Trusts. - We have thus far considered estates of a corporeal nature only; but there are also incorporeal estates, such as rents, easements, etc.

But the general principles applicable to the one class will also apply to the other; and whatever there may be peculiar to any particular species of incorporeal estate will be treated under the appropriate head.