The parties who have entered into any contract may by a subsequent agreement agree to release each other from all liability for the performance of said contract. Such a contract as well as the original contract requires a consideration; if something remains to be done on both sides, the mutual releases will be consideration one for the other. In case, however, only one party is released from his promise, this promise to release must either be under seal,6 or must be supported by a collateral consideration.7 This subject of the consideration for a release is thoroughly discussed in the case of Kidder vs. Kidder:8

"A release under seal is sometimes called a technical release; although in equity it has no greater effect than a parol release, yet it differed from the latter in one quality materially; it is self-sustaining, the seal implying a consideration. Not so is it with a release not under seal. There a consideration of some sort is necessary to support it. 2 Dan., C. Pr., 766; Whitehall vs. Wilson, 3 Penn. R., 405; 1 Barr, 445; 7 Barr,

3 Scott vs. Edgar, 159 Ind., 38;

41; 60 N. E., 468; Wade vs.

Curtis, 196 Ga., 309, 311; 52

A., 762. * Wait vs. Brewster, 31 Vt., 516,

528; Green vs. Russell, 132

Mass., 536-538.

5 The Harriman, 9 Wall, 161-172;

Harrison vs. Ry. Co., 74 Mo., 364, 371.

6 Finch vs. Simon, 70 N. Y. S.,

361. 7 Lancaster vs. Elliott, 60 Mo.,

App. 245. 8 33 Pa., St. 268.

100; 1 Rawle. Wentz vs. Dehaven, 1 S. & R., 312, it is thought, sustains a different doctrine. There the release was in parol; that is, it was not under seal, and expressed no consideration. It was sustained on the ground that the release of the mortgage was by way of advancement to a child. This was inferred from the form of the writing and forbearance to sue by the intestate during life. Had it been expressed, the case would have doubtless stood firm upon a consideration. But that case has not been followed. In Kennedy vs. Ware, 1 Barr, 445, Gibson, C. J., finds fault with his apparent support of it in Whitehall vs. Wilson, 3 Penn. R., and adds, 'Wentz vs. Dehavens is not to be sustained on any ground.'

"The release in question in this case is without a seal, and without any consideration expressed. As a release it was void. It was nudum pactum, and should have been so held by the Court.

"The defendant in error, feeling the force of the want of consideration, as a dernier resort has endeavored to give effect to the release as a gift to the releasor of one-half of the demand. But this is, if possible, a more hopeless undertaking than that of supporting the release without a consideration. It was not an executed gift, even if the instrument would bear the interpretation that a gift was intended; because the instrument to be given was not delivered. If, then, it was but an agreement to give, it could not be enforced without a consideration, any more than could the release. On this point the case In re Campbell's Estate, 7 Barr, 100, need only be cited. There it is said by Gibson, C. J., that 'the gift of a bond, note, or any other chattel, therefore, cannot be made by words in futuro, or by words in presenti, unaccompanied by such delivery of the possession as makes the disposal of the thing irrevocable.'

"But even if there had been a consideration expressed, it seems to me that the release was so qualified as not to touch this case, but only to operate, as all such releases do in equity, as an agreement not to pursue the releasee individually. He is 'hereby released from all individual liability whatever in the premises,' does not touch the case on trial of joint liability. But it is not necessary to pursue this, as the points already noticed rule this case."

Either a contract under seal or one which the Statute of Frauds requires to be in writing may be released by parol.9