Congress has enacted various laws for the regulation of interstate and foreign commerce, which, so far as their substance is concerned, may properly be denominated police regulations. Among them are those relating to the use of safety appliances, hours of service of employees, monthly reports of accidents, arbitration of controversies between railroads and their employees, the exclusion of impure goods and lottery tickets from interstate transportation, employers' liability, etc. Strictly speaking, however, the constitutional authority for this legislation has not been derived from any general "police power " possessed by the Federal Government, but from the grant of authority in the Commerce Clause. That these laws, in so far as they are constitutional. draw their validity from this clause and not from a federal police power is a corollary from the general doctrine that the General -Government possesses no powers whatever except by way of express grant, and powers implied from such grants.4

2 9 Wh. 1; 6 L. ed. 23.

3 In Champion v. Ames (188 U. S. 321; 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 321; 47 L. ed. 492) the court, after a review of adjudged cases, say: "The cases cited . . . show that the power to regulate commerce among the several States is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government, having in its constitution the same restrictions in the exercise of power as are found in the Constitution of the United States; that such power is plenary, complete in itself, and may be exerted by Congress to the utmost extent, subject only to such limitations as the Constitution imposes upon the exercise of the powers granted by it; and that in determining the character of the regulations to be adopted Congress has a large discretion which is not to be controlled by the courts, simply because, in their opinion, such regulations may not be the best or most effective that could be employed."