Von Moltke's definition is really broad enough to cover tactics as well, and is therefore not quite as exact, for our purpose, as du Teil's, for the latter in its very terms presupposes a period when the attacking force is not in contact with the enemy. In football, of course, one is always in contact with the enemy, but in that part of the field short of actual striking distance the tactics of football in the general sense may be called passive, as distinguished from the active tactics in effect when the team faces the opposing eleven near its own goal line. There comes a time, after crossing the center of the field, and in certain cases on the defensive side of it, when active football tactics will make their appearance in the form of wide end runs, and runs from kick formations, commonly known as "long gainers," and these may be likened to the use of cavalry in raiding operations. But as a general rule the main reliance up to the moment of striking is placed in maneuvering for the right of position.

Strictly speaking, then, in football strategy deals with plays and more especially the choice of plays in their relation to the position of the team on the field, while tactics is concerned with the execution of the play itself and with the individual and team technique necessary to make any particular play a success.

Now it is practically mandatory in football that the maneuvering be done "only around a fixed point," for the ball itself is the fixed point, and no play can be made to go with anything like power, precision, speed, and "concentration on the decisive point" otherwise. Even the forward pass, with its combined delay and deception, must start from the position of the ball in the actual line-up. Therefore Napoleon's advice is unavoidable. Incidentally it leads to maneuvers peculiarly similar to those made in actual warfare.

Let us for a moment consider the attack as it is worked out in warfare by Major Wagner, first considering the reasons why the aggressive is attractive to the commander who is reasonably well equipped. I quote Major Wagner literally, leaving his technical terms just as they appear in his work entitled "Organization and Tactics."

"The commander acting on the offensive can choose his own line of action. He has from the first a definite plan, and can make feigned attacks against different parts of the enemy's position, while massing a preponderating force against a single point. On the other hand, the defender, in the dark as to his adversary's designs, and uncertain as to the point of attack, must disseminate his force so as to be strong at every point where a heavy assault may fall.

"The offensive implies numerical or moral superiority, or both, and is an indication of confidence on the part of the commander which tends to raise the morale of the troops. This is heightened by the forward impulsion, and the turmoil and excitement of the attack; and the assailants are comparatively unaffected by the sight of their own dead and wounded, whom they leave behind, while the defenders' killed and wounded encumber the position. The morale of the defenders is further shaken by the spectacle of an unflinching advance which their fire does not stop."

Leaving out that sinister part of the quotation dealing with the dead and wounded, there is much here that can be applied to football. The team acting on the offensive has much the same advantage that the attacking commander has in battle, save that while in midfield the morale of the defense may be somewhat shaken, it almost invariably improves as the team is driven back toward its own goal line. In football the choice of the rushing or "infantry" attack at fairly long range indicates either that the field general has overestimated the strength of his own eleven and underestimated that of his opponents, or that he is absolutely sure of the superior personnel of his own eleven as well as its team superiority. As a general rule, however, the advantage lies with the attack only when it is within fair striking distance of its adversary's goal line. The "forward impulsion" is undoubtedly one of the great solidifiers of the attacking team if the plays are not checked at too early a stage of the advance.

There are, indeed, certain institutions that seem constitutionally to need the feeling of "forward impulsion" at an early stage of the big game. Princeton is a conspicuous example, the Tigers often running the ball when before the wind, even in their own territory. Thus as far back as 1876, playing against Yale at Hoboken, the Orange and Black chose the wind, but on receiving the ball at once started the running game, carrying the leather back to midfield before kicking. There are numerous other instances, but perhaps the best example of a team's morale being affected for the better by immediate forward impulsion is furnished by the Princeton-Yale game of 1910 in which the Minnesota shift was used by Yale for the first time in the East. Yale had had a disastrous season, losing to Brown just before the Princeton game by the score of 21 to 0. The Eli backs were notorious fumblers, and indeed the whole team was as unsteady as I have seen come out of New Haven in many a year.

The moment Yale got the ball after the game opened the Blue set the shift in motion, and in three attempts the New Haven backs cleaned up a total of twenty-six yards. Undoubtedly if the Elis had gone in for kicking from the start, had eschewed fumbling, and had saved the shift until within striking distance, a good chance for a touchdown might have developed, but in the interests of the morale of the Yale eleven the Minnesota play was turned on at once, with great effect so far as Princeton was concerned, but with even greater effect on the Yale players, who for the first time in the season found that they were equipped with something approaching a powerful attack. After ten minutes of play Yale was fully fifty per cent. stronger than when the team first appeared on the field, and this was due almost entirely to the confidence restored by the new maneuver.